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 Oceans of ink have been spilled on forests of trees arguing the merits of 
Mapp v. Ohio
1
 and Miranda v. Arizona.
2
  As Tracey Maclin has recently shown, 
opposition to Mapp’s Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule surfaced in Supreme 
Court conferences surprisingly soon after the 5-4 case was decided.
3
  And in light 
of Herring v. United States,
4
 the robust exclusionary rule that Mapp favored 
appears to be hanging by a thread.
5
 
 Controversy over Miranda’s warnings and waiver requirement was there for 
all to see in the three vigorous dissents.  Most notable was Justice White’s biting 
claim that Miranda would cause innocent victims to die but that, for the majority, 
there is “a saving factor: the next victims are uncertain, unnamed and 
unrepresented in this case.”6  A series of cases over the next forty-five years 
limited Miranda’s effect on police interrogation; the most recent retrenchment, 
Berghuis v. Thompkins,
7
 held that a properly warned suspect who makes no 
explicit waiver and says almost nothing in response to three hours of interrogation 
nonetheless waives his Miranda rights if he then answers a question.  
 But Gideon v. Wainwright
8
 was “the good war,” a unanimous judgment that 
no indigent defendant should face felony charges without a lawyer.  Betts v. Brady
9
 
had held in 1942 that non-capital felony defendants were not necessarily entitled to 
counsel at state expense.  By 1963, the idea of an indigent felony defendant 
without counsel facing a trained district attorney was so unappealing that the Court 
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relied on little more than innate fairness to justify overruling Betts.
10
  Gideon not 
only seems eminently fair but also self-executing in ways that neither Mapp nor 
Miranda could be.  To make Mapp and Miranda work, courts have to suppress 
evidence taken in violation of the relevant constitutional right.  The loss of (almost 
always) reliable evidence of guilt is the principal reason that Mapp and Miranda 
were controversial from the start and suffered at the hands of later, more hostile 
Courts.  But Gideon is satisfied once the defendant is provided a lawyer—the 
ungainly problem of ineffective assistance off to one side for the moment.   
  And yet there has been for years a slow dawning of awareness that Gideon 
has fallen far short of the Court’s initial vision.  All six of the essays in this 
symposium express, in varying degrees, sadness and frustration at the state of 
Gideon in 2014.  The crux of the criticism is that public defense is significantly 
under-funded and plagued with perverse incentives, leading to huge caseloads for 
defenders and worse outcomes for defendants.   
We should pause to examine the meaning of “worse outcomes.”  At one level, 
a worse outcome is when the defendant does not feel that his case has been 
adequately defended.  More defenders who could spend more time on each case 
would ameliorate this bad outcome.  But at an instrumental level, better defense 
suggests more acquittals, more dismissals, and better plea deals with shorter 
average sentences.  We will shortly see a study concluding that if all murder 
defendants in Philadelphia from 1994 to 2005 had received adequate 
representation, there would have been roughly 10% more acquittals and a total of 
6,400 years in shorter sentences.
11
 
  Ironically enough, therefore, critics have turned on Gideon not because it 
frees the guilty but because it does not free the guilty often enough or reduce their 
sentences sufficiently!!  To be sure, I exaggerate for effect.  We know that a non-
trivial number of defendants are innocent.  But there is no evidence that increasing 
the percentage of acquittals, or decreasing the average sentence, disproportionately 
benefits innocent defendants.  Thus, the net effect of improving outcomes for 
indigent defendants will be to benefit (mostly) guilty defendants.  Do legislatures 
actually want better outcomes if the benefit flows to (mostly) guilty defendants?  I 
will return to this idea later, but for now, let’s assume that better outcomes are the 
goal of actors who provide indigent defense.  
  Has Gideon fallen short of its promise to provide better outcomes to 
indigent defendants?  Yes, it has failed, at least when judged by the Warren 
Court’s rhetoric.  Justice Black, the populist from Alabama, first struck a blow in 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10  The Gideon Court made a lame attempt to characterize Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), 
the 1932 Scottsboro case, as settled law from which Betts departed.  But the effort was unavailing.  In 
his concurrence, Justice Harlan said, “I agree that Betts v. Brady should be overruled, but consider it 
entitled to a more respectful burial than has been accorded . . . .”  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.  Harlan is 
right. 
11  James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make: The Effect 
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favor of empowering indigent criminal defendants in Griffin v. Illinois.
12
  The issue 
in Griffin was whether indigent defendants had a right to a transcript at state 
expense when filing appeals.  The Court held yes.  A plurality said, “Providing 
equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem.”13  
The most often quoted line from Griffin is: “There can be no equal justice where 
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”14  Eight 
members of the Court in Gideon signed onto the following: “From the very 
beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis 
on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before 
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.”15 
 Taken literally, this rhetoric promised an equality that today appears almost 
absurd.  But the Court could not have meant bringing all defendants up to the level 
of the wealthiest, who hire teams of the best lawyers money can buy.  It must have 
meant making indigent defendants equal to the average criminal defendant who 
could afford counsel.  That would have seemed possible at the time.  President 
Lyndon Johnson made an aggressive call for a War on Poverty in his first State of 
the Union address, not even a year after Gideon: “‘We shall not rest until that war 
is won,’ Johnson said.  ‘The richest nation on Earth can afford to win it.  We 
cannot afford to lose it.’”16  In the heady days of a War on Poverty, courts 
interpreting Gideon might have imagined—if not Perry Mason—at least an A-rated 
lawyer with time to investigate defenses and provide zealous representation. 
 And how close has Gideon come to achieving the goal of making the 
indigent defendant the equal of the defendant who can afford to pay counsel?  We 
do not know how frequently Gideon is ignored.  The American Bar Association 
(ABA) in its 2004 report claimed that judges and prosecutors sometimes find ways 
around the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants.
17
  The report cites no 
empirical evidence.  I know of a judge who routinely sentenced unrepresented 
indigent DUI defendants to a few days in jail without getting a waiver of counsel; I 
assume he thought almost all would serve the few days without knowing that their 
right to counsel had been violated (or without caring, I suppose).  
 But even if these practices are outliers, even if almost all indigent 
defendants receive the benefit of a lawyer, two questions remain for Gideon.  First, 
to what extent are the outcomes over the universe of cases instrumentally better 
now than they were before Gideon?  In Gideon’s case, counsel did produce an 
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instrumentally better outcome.  When he represented himself, he was convicted, 
but appointed counsel secured an acquittal upon retrial.
18
  
 To answer the instrumental question, the most appropriate measure would 
be to focus on a set of cases with counsel and a set of similar cases without counsel 
and compare the outcomes.  Fortunately, or unfortunately, that metric is 
unavailable in criminal cases because Gideon mandates counsel in the absence of 
waiver,
19
 and waiver cases are far too idiosyncratic to serve as a control group. 
 At least three randomized studies of the value of counsel in civil cases have 
been done.  One study involved appeals of unemployment insurance claims, and 
two studies dealt with tenants facing eviction.
20
  Two of the three studies found no 
statistically significant improvement in outcomes when a lawyer represented the 
claimant or the tenant.
21
  This finding is not as surprising as it might seem.  In 
administrative hearings, the judge typically does most, if not all, of the 
questioning, thus diminishing the value of a lawyer, perhaps to the vanishing point.  
I once represented claimants who appealed the denial of their claim for Social 
Security disability.
22
  The administrative law judges had reviewed the written 
record and did such a good job questioning the claimants that I was often forced to 
repeat a line of questioning just so the client would think he was getting a benefit 
from my appearance.  This is obviously not the case in felony criminal trials, and I 
would be shocked if a randomized study of indigent criminal cases showed no 
benefit from counsel. 
 Assuming a non-trivial instrumental benefit from having counsel, the 
second, and harder, question for Gideon is whether defenders deliver adequate 
representation.  This is obviously a subjective determination.  But when thoughtful 
policy makers study the operation of the Gideon right to counsel, they almost 
universally conclude that indigent defenders, in general, have too many cases to be 
able to provide effective representation.  A Bureau of Justice Statistics report 
shows that, in 2007, public defenders in Colorado were assigned, on average, 229 
felony cases and 111 misdemeanor cases; Wisconsin public defenders were 
assigned 122 felony cases and 245 misdemeanor cases.
23
   
 Mary Sue Backus and Paul Marcus were reporters for the National 
Committee on the Right to Counsel that in 2009 found that a national crisis existed 
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in the provision of indigent defense.  Their conclusion, published separately from 
the committee report, is typical:   
 
By every measure in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice 
system, the defense function for poor people is drastically underfinanced.  
This lack of money is reflected in a wide range of problems, including 
poor people's limited access to attorneys and the resulting ineffective 
assistance of counsel [as well as] excessive public defender caseloads 
and insufficient salaries and compensation for defense lawyers.
24
  
 
 The committee report, entitled Justice Denied: America’s Continuing 
Neglect of our Constitutional Right to Counsel, details systemic and endemic 
failures of indigent defense in this country.
25
  It found “overwhelming” evidence 
that, in most of the country, “quality defense work is simply impossible because of 
inadequate funding, excessive caseloads, a lack of genuine independence, and 
insufficient availability of other essential resources.”26  The report calls for “fair 
compensation” for defenders as well as “parity between defense counsel and the 
prosecution in resources.”27  Cynics like me make fun of these exhortations on the 
ground that states do not have enough money to fix roads and bridges and to 
provide quality K-12 education.
28
  As long as those ventures are underfunded, 
indigent defense will just have to get by on the crumbs that are left. 
   But a question that is rarely, if ever, addressed is whether better funding 
would make an instrumental difference.  It seems intuitively right that defenders 
with more time to spend on each case would deliver better representation and thus 
achieve a lower conviction rate and shorter sentences via better plea bargaining.  
But is it right?  Maybe not.  Prosecutors have all the cards.  They can dismiss weak 
cases or bargain them for time served or another outcome too attractive for the 
defendant to refuse; the prosecutor’s incentive to dismiss or bargain down weak 
cases is presumably roughly the same regardless of the defender’s work load.  
Strong cases are strong cases whether the defender has 200 files on her desk or 
only 20.  So weak cases are not likely affected by the work load of the defender; 
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strong cases are not likely affected at all.  Are cases “in the middle” affected?  
Perhaps.  One imagines that if a defender files a lot of motions, the prosecutor 
might be more likely to cut an attractive deal.  On the other hand, it might work the 
other way.  If a defender had a reputation for filing motions that are borderline 
frivolous, the prosecutor’s position might harden.  She might refuse to entertain 
any deal and insist on a trial.  There is much here we do not know. 
 We can gain a bit of insight by looking at studies that compare outcomes 
produced by public defenders, by private counsel, and by appointed counsel.
29
  
While the results are to some degree inconsistent, it is fair to say that public 
defenders generally compare favorably with appointed counsel and less favorably 
with privately retained counsel.  This makes sense.  Private counsel are probably, 
on the whole, putting in more time on each case than public defenders because 
private lawyers bill for their time.  But public defenders are probably putting in 
more time, on the whole, than appointed counsel.  This would be true because of 
the incentives Professor Stephen Schulhofer outlines in his essay in this 
symposium: appointed counsel in systems that provide very low compensation 
rates have a strong incentive to put in as little time as possible on each case.
30
 
 Anderson and Heaton studied indigent murder defense in Philadelphia, 
concluding that public defenders obtained significantly better outcomes than 
appointed counsel.
31
  To put numbers on the better outcomes, the researchers 
conducted a thought experiment: 
 
Suppose the 2,459 defendants in our sample represented by appointed 
counsel had been represented instead by Defender Association counsel.  
Based on the results in Table 2, we would expect 270 defendants who 
were convicted of murder to have been acquitted of this charge with 
Defender Association representation.  Three hundred ninety-six 
individuals who received life sentences without the possibility of parole 
would have been received shorter sentences with an expectation of 
eventual release.  In the aggregate, we would expect the time served by 
the 2,459 defendants for the crimes observed in our data to decrease by 
6,400 years.
32
 
 
 Was time spent on cases a factor in the better outcomes produced by public 
defenders?  Like many jurisdictions, Philadelphia pays appointed counsel very 
little, which has the perverse incentive pointed out above.  Anderson and Heaton 
concluded that if appointed counsel provided the time necessary to adequately 
represent a Philadelphia murder defendant, the authorized fee would work out to 
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$2 an hour!  The incentive to put in the necessary hours must be dramatically 
compromised if the average pay is $2 per hour.  Moreover, the Philadelphia fee 
structure created little incentive to prepare for trial, because it paid much more for 
trial time than for preparation; some of those interviewed for the Philadelphia 
study suggested “that appointed counsel do relatively little preparation.”33  The 
salaried public defender does not need to consider whether she is wasting time on a 
case that could be billed at a higher rate to other clients. 
 So here’s a simple question that I do not believe has been answered.  
Holding other factors constant to the extent possible, do outcomes achieved by 
public defenders vary with caseloads?  A Bureau of Justice Statistics study 
surveyed the average 2007 caseloads in twenty-two states—caseloads being cases 
received in calendar year 2007, which of course is not the same as the average 
caseload at any given moment; the caseload at any moment could be more (cases 
pending from the year before) or less (cases that are dismissed or resolved quickly) 
than the number of cases received.
34
  These twenty-two states “had a state public 
defender program that oversaw the operations, policies, and practices of the 427 
public defender offices located in these states.”35  Comparing states that have 
statewide public defender programs is the best way to hold constant other factors 
that might influence outcomes because defenders are hired and paid on a statewide 
basis.  If we compare outcomes in similar states that have substantially different 
caseloads, we might find evidence of the value of counsel in criminal cases.   
 When I first had the idea to compare caseloads to outcomes, I thought the 
difficult piece would be finding reliable evidence of caseloads.  But the excellent 
Bureau of Justice Statistics study solved that problem for the twenty-two states that 
have statewide public defender programs.  The easy part, I thought, would be 
finding the conviction/acquittal/dismissal rates in the various states.  I assumed 
that states, like the federal government, would routinely keep those statistics.  
Twenty-first century computers would make gathering these data a simple task.  
But Susan Lyons, government documents librarian at Rutgers, Newark Law 
School, told me that cutbacks in state budgets and the disappearance of federal 
funding for data gathering have reduced state criminal justice data collections.
36
 
 And that was indeed my experience.  I identified four state cohorts from the 
BJS study: (1) Minnesota and Wisconsin; (2) Colorado, Montana, and North 
Dakota; (3) New Jersey and Delaware; and (4) Vermont and New Hampshire.  The 
latter two states did not have sufficiently different caseloads to make for a good 
test, but I left Vermont in the study because I was able to get its felony conviction 
rates.  Colorado, Delaware, and Vermont make their conviction rates available 
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online.
37
  The New Jersey Office of the Courts was kind enough to supply me with 
data from 2007.
38
  So far, my inquiries to Minnesota, Wisconsin, Montana, and 
North Dakota have been ignored.   
 I should point out how messy the data are.  My goal was to compare felony 
caseloads with felony conviction rates.  But I discovered that defenders in some 
jurisdictions had relatively low felony caseloads and very high misdemeanor 
caseloads.  Even if misdemeanor cases take much less time than felony cases, it 
must be true that very high misdemeanor caseloads take time away from 
representing felony clients.  Thus, I had to consider both felony and misdemeanor 
caseloads when comparing states.   
 In Wisconsin, for example, the average felony caseload in 2007 was 122 and 
the average misdemeanor caseload was 245
39
, while in Minnesota, the averages 
were 75 and 53.
40
  Though Wisconsin and Minnesota are far from perfect 
matches—culturally they are quite different—a difference in caseloads as stark as 
the one we see might suggest “better” outcomes in Minnesota compared to 
Wisconsin if caseloads matter.  The state with the highest average felony caseload 
in the study was Colorado, at 229 along with 111 misdemeanor cases.
41
  Though 
no state in the study is truly similar to Colorado, one might look at North Dakota, 
average felony caseload of 80 and misdemeanor caseload of 65
42
, and Montana, 
average felony caseload of 45 and misdemeanor caseload of 96.
43
  Even though a 
state with Denver, Boulder, and Colorado Springs is quite different from North 
Dakota and Montana, the vast difference in caseloads might make a difference.  
Delaware, felony caseload of 83, is a reasonably similar state to New Jersey, 
felony caseload of 142; the problem here is that Delaware has a high misdemeanor 
caseload, 296, and New Jersey did not report its misdemeanor caseload.
44
  Here are 
the caseload data in tabular form: 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
37  See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN COLORADO 2006 (2007) 
[hereinafter CRIME AND JUSTICE IN COLORADO], available at 
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38  Letter and attachment from Glenn A. Grant, Acting Administrative Director of the New Jersey 
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40  Id. 
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42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
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Felony           Misdemeanor 
 caseload           caseload 
Wisconsin          122                245 
Minnesota            75                  53 
 
Delaware             83                 291 
New Jersey         142                N/R 
 
Colorado           229                111 
Montana             45                   96 
North Dakota          80                  65 
 
Vermont             75                  225 
 
 Of course, to compare caseloads is not to foreclose other factors that might 
affect outcomes.  One obvious factor is salary.  If salaries are markedly higher in 
Wisconsin, say, than in Minnesota, perhaps a better quality defender is hired in 
Wisconsin; this makes the somewhat dubious assumption that public defenders are 
significantly motivated by money.  A recent study shows that increasing the salary 
of federal circuit judges would not improve the quality of their opinions; perhaps 
increasing the salary of public defenders would not increase the quality of 
representation.
45
  But even if the assumption that higher salaries produce better 
defenders holds, salaries are relatively similar in each cohort of states.
46
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
45  Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 63, 112 (2008). 
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 State       Entry
47
      5 yrs. or less exp.      6 yrs. or more exp. 
                     Min.    Max.        Min.    Max. 
 
 Wis.        47,000      49,000  49,000        49,000  113,000 
 Minn.       49,000      n/a     92,000        n/a       92,000 
 
 Delaware     53,000      57,000  76,000        79,000   98,000 
 New Jersey   54,000      69,000  98,000        79,000  113,000 
 
 Colorado     46,000      n/a     59,000        n/a       59,000 
 Montana     40,000      58,000  70,000        60,000   70,000 
 North Dakota  46,000      46,000  60,000        50,000   62,000 
 
 Vermont     37,000      44,000  56,000        53,000   67,000 
 
Thus, while there is a significant salary differential between the East Coast 
and upper Midwest states, on the one hand, and the New England and Western 
states on the other hand, there is not a lot of difference within the cohorts. 
 The only cohort for which I have caseload data is New Jersey and Delaware, 
and that comparison is incomplete because I do not have misdemeanor data for 
New Jersey.  But just for fun, here are the data that I have.  The felony conviction 
rate in Colorado in 2006 was 70%.
48
  In Vermont, for fiscal year ending June 30, 
2007, the conviction rate was 79%.
49
  In Delaware, over the same time period, the 
conviction rate was 65%.
50
  In New Jersey for 2007, it was 71.5%.
51
  In tabular 
form here are the data: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
47  I used the minimum entry level on the assumption that the maximum was reserved for the 
experienced criminal defense lawyer who wanted to join public defense and that these hires are 
relatively rare. 
48  CRIME AND JUSTICE IN COLORADO, supra note 37, at 58. 
49  VERMONT JUDICIARY STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 9. 
50  DELAWARE STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 28–29. 
51  Letter and attachment from Glenn A. Grant, supra note 38.  
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State  Fel./Misd.      Conviction 
Caseload      Rate 
 
DE   83/291       65% 
CO   229/111      70% 
NJ    142/?        71.5% 
VT   75/225       79% 
  
So the state with the lowest felony caseload, Vermont, has by far the highest 
felony conviction rate.  This, of course, is the opposite from our hypothesis that 
smaller caseloads should produce lower conviction rates.  But since Vermont is 
quite different from the other three states, there is not much we can infer from that 
finding.  I suspect the Vermont data tell us that New England attitudes toward 
crime are more important than caseloads.  Comparing felony caseloads in 
Delaware and New Jersey looks promising.  The two states are quite similar.  New 
Jersey and Delaware share a small border, are coastal states, are heavily 
Democratic, and as of 2010 had tax rates substantially higher than the norm in the 
United States.
52
  Plus, they are both small in area and densely populated; New 
Jersey is the most densely populated state and Delaware the sixth most densely 
populated.
53
  That Delaware has a significantly lower conviction rate than New 
Jersey with a felony caseload 58% that of New Jersey is consistent with our 
hypothesis that smaller caseloads tend to produce lower conviction rates.  But we 
do not know the misdemeanor caseload in New Jersey so even a tentative finding 
must be rejected.  Evidence of a potential link between caseloads and outcomes 
must await a discovery of sources that I missed or the laborious work of collecting 
the data in the cohort states by hand.  
 Notice, however, the Catch-22 inherent in my caseload project.  If it turns 
out that a smaller caseload makes no measurable difference in instrumental 
outcomes, then what would be the rationale for the legislature to increase funding 
for public defenders?  On the other hand, if it turns out that a smaller caseload 
leads to more acquittals and shorter sentences, why would that make a legislature 
want to increase funding?  Imagine trying to sell the legislature on the idea that 
increased funding for public defense would, over time, produce 270 more 
acquittals of murder defendants!  Although the innocence movement has made us 
aware that a non-trivial number of innocent defendants are convicted of murder, 
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the vast majority of defendants are guilty.  As a wag once said, no legislator has 
ever been defeated for being tough on crime. 
 Maybe, just maybe, legislatures ignore the many pleas for better funding for 
indigent defense because they have as much defense as they want—the Goldilocks 
of indigent defense, not too hot, not too cold, just right.  If this is correct, then the 
underfunding for half a century in the face of repeated calls for additional funding 
is not the result of tight budgets.  If this is correct, indigent defense will never be 
funded to the extent necessary to provide the kind of representation envisioned by 
Gideon, and this will be true regardless of a jurisdiction’s ability to fund indigent 
defense.  If a state were suddenly flooded with tax revenues, it would spend the 
money on bullet trains or solar power or tax cuts or free college education.  
Indigent defense would still get the crumbs. 
 The point to this symposium issue, however, is not to discover the secret to 
persuading legislators to radically increase the funding for public defenders, but to 
offer thoughts about how Gideon works today and how it might be made to work 
better.  In that light we have a wealth of insights in six essays.  To see how we got 
where we are today, Professor Michael Mannheimer in Gideon, Miranda, and the 
Downside of Incorporation
54
 concludes that the failure of Gideon, and Miranda, 
resulted from the failure of their bright-line approach.  In attempting to monitor 
state criminal processes, the Warren Court rejected the case-by-case analysis of the 
due process fundamental fairness approach favored by earlier Courts.
55
  To solve 
the indeterminacy problem inherent in case-by-case balancing, the Warren Court 
incorporated into the Due Process Clause most of the specific criminal procedure 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
56
  The problem, which quickly became apparent, is 
that the specific guarantees are also indeterminate when close cases arise.
57
   
 Miranda required specific warnings and waiver before police can conduct 
custodial interrogation, but the underlying question of voluntariness is a morass of 
indeterminacy.  Whether the state or county provided an indigent defendant a 
lawyer is easy enough to determine but whether that lawyer was effective, ah, that 
is a morass of the first order.  When faced with these indeterminate outcomes of 
the incorporated bright line rules, Mannheimer shows that the Court refused to go 
back into the briar patch of case-by-case analysis.
58
  Instead, it adopted virtually 
irrebuttable presumptions that create new bright lines.
59
  The Court has instructed 
that voluntariness of a confession is heavily presumed when a suspect is warned 
and later expressly waives his rights, or even answers question.
60
  And the Court 
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told us in Strickland v. Washington that “counsel is strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment”61 and that courts reviewing counsel’s strategic 
decisions should “apply[] a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”62  
It seems unlikely that these new bright-line rules would have been favored by the 
Courts that decided Gideon and Miranda.  But the doctrinal lines indeed are bright. 
 The bright lines are only doctrinal, however.  On the ground, defenders are 
the primary enforcers of Gideon’s promise, and Professor Alexandra Natapoff 
demonstrates in Gideon’s Servants and the Criminalization of Poverty63 that their 
jobs have become messier and more complex as American law has, in essence, 
criminalized poverty.  Being poor leads to various criminal law consequences, 
which Natapoff describes, and once poor people are caught in the criminal justice 
web, their lives spiral downward.
64
  They face fines, fees, lost work, and a heavy 
burden on future employment, credit, and reputation.
65
  Because being poor is part 
of the problem of indigent criminal defendants, the defenders now find themselves 
called on to “provide a wide array of social services and legal aid that make them 
look less like the traditional defense attorneys contemplated by Gideon v. 
Wainwright and more like social workers.”66 
 But the hydraulics works the other way, too.  In schools, hospitals, and 
welfare offices, civil servants are taking on some aspects of the role of law 
enforcement.  Natapoff observes:  
 
These two phenomena are the flip sides of the same coin.  Public 
defenders and other criminal justice actors are morphing into service 
providers in response to the tight connection between criminalization and 
their clients’ poverty, the same connection that drives teachers and 
welfare caseworkers to treat their poor clients as presumptive criminals.
67
   
 
Thus what Natapoff calls the bottom of the “penal pyramid,” is a “world of 
minor offenses and urban poverty in which crime, unemployment, racial 
segregation, and lack of social services swirl around in one large nearly 
inextricable mass.”68  As if the life of an overburdened defender were not hard 
enough, now she has to be a social worker as well as a lawyer. 
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 Mannheimer and Natapoff describe a doctrinal and a social welfare world 
for defenders that could not have been envisioned by the Gideon Court.  Now let’s 
consider the day-to-day role of defending indigents against serious criminal 
charges.  Did the Gideon Court foresee that more or less accurately?  While Justice 
Black’s brief opinion for the Gideon Court fails to describe the intricacies of how 
indigent defense would work, or how it was to be funded, it quoted Justice 
Sutherland’s soaring rhetoric from Powell v. Alabama, noting that “the right to be 
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to 
be heard by counsel” because defense requires “skill in the science of law.”69  The 
defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him.”70 
 Four essays examine “skill in the science of law” and “the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings” in indigent defense 2014.  Professor 
Jonathan Rapping, founder and president of Gideon’s Promise, provides a critical 
overview of indigent defense in Grooming Tomorrow’s Change Agents: The Role 
of Law Schools in Helping to Create a Just Society.
71
  According to Rapping, the 
indigent defense system is dysfunctional as a whole because it is infused with a 
value system that is indifferent to justice.
72
  The actors that shape the criminal 
justice system have been shaped by this system of corrupted values.
73
  Second and 
third generations of lawyers, judges, and politicians largely see nothing wrong with 
expecting defenders to operate with caseloads in the hundreds and little money for 
investigators and experts.
74
 
As Rapping notes:  
 
There is no better gauge of the health of American democracy than the 
way human beings are treated in our criminal justice system.  At the very 
core of who we are as a nation is a deep seated respect for individual 
liberty and an appreciation of the need to jealously guard it against the 
inherent abuses of government.
75
    
 
He makes a powerful case that “those responsible for justice in America 
frequently promote unjust outcomes.”76  But he does not throw up his hands in 
defeat.  He has redoubled his efforts at Gideon’s Promise and on the faculty of 
Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School to groom a generation of professionals who 
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embrace the ideas that are fundamental to the American scheme of justice.
77
  His 
essay describes two innovative programs designed to teach justice values to new 
defenders and to empower them to resist the hydraulic power of the culture of 
injustice.
78
   
 If you need convincing of the power of the hydraulics that drive indigent 
defense toward mediocrity, Professor Carrie Leonetti’s essay, Painting the Roses 
Red: Confessions of a Recovering Public Defender,
79
 is your cup of tea.  Even if 
you believe in your heart that indigent defense is not what it should be, Leonetti’s 
essay will cause you to sit up and take notice.  It is a powerful, gut-wrenching view 
from the trenches of six years of being a public defender, two in a state system and 
four in a federal defender’s office.  Leonetti draws her title from Alice in 
Wonderland, where white roses have to be painted red to satisfy the Queen of 
Hearts.  The message is that if something is not right, you can force it to look (sort 
of) right, no matter how ridiculous the effort appears.  And that is an apt 
description indigent defense, circa 2014.  We force it to look like what Gideon 
envisioned.  Leonetti shatters the illusion that the roses are actually red.  
She predicts that eighty percent of the public defenders who read her essay  
 
[W]ill be pissed.  Their reaction will range from perturbed (‘Oh, great, 
one more person contributing to the stereotype about ‘dump truck’ public 
defenders. . . .’ ) to enraged (‘This ivory tower quitter thinks that after 
only six years of practice she knows more than people who have been 
doing this stuff for decades! . . .’).80   
 
But she makes clear that she didn’t write the essay for the eighty percent: “They 
live in a world of such overwork and underpay that it is structurally impossible for 
them to engage in best practices for their clients.”81  Instead, she wrote:  
 
[F]or the other twenty percent.  Do not read into this Essay that they do 
not exist.  Over the years, I have worked with brilliant, talented, hard-
working people.  I am in awe of how they stay in the game, some of them 
without becoming alcoholics.  They are the ones reading this and 
thinking, “Thank god.  Someone is saying it out loud.”82 
 
And, as the editor of this symposium, I can only say to Carrie Leonetti:  
Thank god you are saying it out loud in this issue.   
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 In Client Choice for Indigent Criminal Defendants: Theory and 
Implementation, Professor Stephen Schulhofer details why defenders are caught in 
a pressure chamber beyond their control.
83
  There are essentially three systems for 
providing counsel for indigents: a system where private counsel are appointed in 
individual cases; a public defender system; or a contract system where a lawyer or 
a firm agrees to represent all the indigent defendants for a global fee or a fixed fee 
per case.
84
  In all three models, the indigent defendant has no choice in selecting 
his attorney, which is precisely the opposite from how the American legal system 
operates outside of the indigent defendant context.
85
  More troubling, the 
incentives in all three systems operate to discourage defenders from putting in the 
time needed to provide a zealous defense.
86
   
 The scandalously low fee per hour and maximum fees provided in private 
appointments, which we saw in the Philadelphia appointed counsel system, create 
a powerful incentive to spend less time on indigent clients so that there is more 
time to spend on clients who can pay the hourly rate needed for the lawyer to 
prosper.
87
  Thus, the optimal outcome for the defender, if not for the client, is a 
plea bargain hurriedly obtained.  A similarly powerful set of incentives operates in 
the contract system.  The contract attorney or firm almost always has private 
clients, who are likely to pay much more than the contract fee.
88
  Because the 
contract attorney gets paid the same regardless of how much time the lawyer puts 
into the case, her optimal outcome is a plea bargain arrived at on day one, again to 
save hours for paying clients.
89
  Public defenders have no paying clients to favor, 
but they, too, get paid the same whether they write long appellate briefs or short 
briefs, whether they try 10% of their cases or 0%.
90
  And even if the defenders are 
driven by pride and integrity to want to spend an adequate amount of time on their 
cases, the caseloads in many states, as we saw earlier, are staggering. 
 Is there a solution?  Perhaps.  Schulhofer makes the case for letting 
defendants choose a lawyer, either a public defender or a private lawyer.
91
  If a 
private lawyer accepts employment, then he or she will be paid according to the 
compensation schedule.
92
  Unless the compensation schedule is liberalized, that 
means the pool of willing private defenders will mostly include lawyers who are 
either idealistic or who need the low-paid work.
93
  But notice an interesting 
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incentive for the second type of lawyer: Unlike lawyers who are conscripted into 
representing indigent defendants, the lawyer who accepts the case has an incentive 
to do a good job so that he gets more indigent defendants.
94
  Schulhofer concludes 
his essay by looking at a client-choice pilot project in Texas.
95
  The Texas Indigent 
Defense Commission chose Comal County for the project and was able to get 
enthusiastic support from virtually all the relevant actors for an innovative program 
that brings free-market principles to bear on the indigent defense problem.
96
  
Though the pilot program is still underway, its success in solving the mechanical 
problems inherent in client choice is heartening.  
 Texas leads us naturally to Professor Jennifer Laurin’s essay.  She has 
detected a pulse of change, faint though it might be, that is beating in some unusual 
places, and one of them is Texas.  In Gideon By the Numbers: The Emergence of 
Evidence-Based Practice in Indigent Defense,
97
 Laurin notes that while everyone 
knows the general story of how criminal defense is not up to par, “[c]ritically, 
though, beyond those broad-brush characterizations from ten thousand feet above, 
painfully little is known about the details of indigent defense in the United 
States.”98  But that is changing.  The broad-brush view of indigent defense is being 
subject to careful, quantitative analysis in jurisdictions that are developing 
“evidence-based practices.”99  This form of empirical analysis began in medicine 
and is based on the common-sense notion that practitioners and policy makers 
should make decisions based “upon the best available data supporting a given 
course of action.”100 
 Laurin details the possibilities that “evidence-based practices” hold for 
criminal justice reform.
101
  She also takes us on a tour of three jurisdictions that 
are, in quite different ways, applying evidence based practices on a state-wide 
basis: North Carolina, Texas, and New York.  As one would expect, empirical 
evidence sometimes leads to difficult decisions.  For example, a Texas study  
 
[D]emonstrated that the public defender achieved better outcomes than 
private assigned counsel by a number of measures, including a greater 
proportion of case dismissals and acquittals.  But the study also found 
that the office did so at significantly higher per-case cost—$944 per 
felony, for example, as compared to $550 for appointed counsel.
102
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One can imagine the argument in favor of spending almost twice as much per 
case for better quality representation.  But one can imagine political actors 
preferring the low cost—indeed, preferring the Goldilocks of fewer case dismissals 
and acquittals.  Indeed, Laurin reports, “There is evidence already that political 
pressure fueled by the cost data is leading judges—who still have discretion 
whether to appoint counsel from the public defender office or a list of private 
attorneys—to opt not to use the office.”103  But whatever the choice, it at least will 
be informed by data.  Texas legislators and judges will know what they are 
“buying” when assigning cases to the public defender office.  
 If Mannheimer, Natapoff, Rapping, and Leonetti leave us feeling that 
Gideon has (largely) failed so far, each writer in his or her own way gives us hope 
that Gideon can yet be saved from the political winds that have blown it off course.  
Schulhofer has specific reasons for optimism; he offers us a theoretical construct of 
client choice that suggests better outcomes, and he details the beginnings of a test 
of the client-choice model.  Even though Laurin tempers the expectations of 
evidence-based practice’s advocates, she too is optimistic that the approach will 
yield some gains.  Maybe, someday, we will not have to paint the roses red.  
Maybe they will actually be red. 
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